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Abstract 
 
Who has power in the construction of economic news in the UK? Are social media reshaping 
how this power is enabled? We examine the public Twitter interactions between journalists, 
political elites, and what is arguably the UK’s most important think tank, the Institute for 
Fiscal Studies (IFS), during the 2015 UK general election campaign. Combining human-
coded content analysis and network analysis of Twitter discourse about the IFS during a 38-
day period, we explain how and why the authority of this think tank is being translated to 
social media. We develop a new, social media theory of ‘primary definers’ and show how the 
political authority on which such roles rest is co-constructed and propagated by professional 
journalists and political elites. Central to this process is a behaviour we conceptualize and 
measure: authority signalling. Our findings call into question some of the more sanguine 
generalizations about social media’s contribution to pluralist democracy. Given the 
dominance of public service broadcasters in the processes we identify, we argue that, despite 
the growth of social media, there can be surprising limits on the extent to which 
contemporary media systems help citizens gain information about the assumptions 
underlying economic policy. 
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We begin from a simple but important normative current in communication research: a media 
system ought to promote a diversity of public information about the assumptions underlying 
government policies. The 2008 global financial crisis and the long period of austerity it 
created have raised crucial questions in this regard. As we continue to move through the 
aftershocks of the Great Recession, what role should media and non-governmental 
organizations play in helping citizens understand economic policy? To what extent do our 
systems for producing economic news empower citizens by helping them grasp why the 
economies of the advanced democracies face such immense challenges? 
In Britain, since the late-2000s, political debate has been dominated by the question of 
the government deficit. Deficit reduction and the need for public spending cuts was the 
central discourse among Britain’s political and media elite during the 2010 and 2015 general 
elections (C. Berry, 2016; Clarke & Newman, 2012). An important actor in this discourse is 
an organization that, over the last decade, has become arguably Britain’s most significant 
think tank: the Institute for Fiscal Studies (IFS). The IFS has long produced rapid-response, 
journalist-friendly analyses of government policy announcements and its ‘policy briefs’ now 
dominate the news cycle following every major UK government statement on taxation and 
spending (Akam, 2016). Jamie Angus, former editor of BBC Radio 4’s The World at One and 
currently editor of Radio 4’s flagship morning news show the Today Programme, vividly told 
us of the IFS’ importance: 
 
When I was editor of The World at One… which I always see as the in-house 
broadcaster of the IFS… I used to have a joke. I used to say to the team “there is a red 
telephone on the desk and you just pick it up and this is a hotline straight through… 
and you just kind of connect them into the studio.”1  
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Robert Peston, arguably Britain’s leading economic journalist and a key figure in 
narrating the financial crisis for BBC News, once said: ‘Basically, when the IFS has 
pronounced, there’s no other argument. It is the word of God’ (quoted in Akam, 2016). 
The linkages between media and the global financial crisis form the overarching 
context of this article. To date, research in this area has mostly focused on the failure of 
professional media to expose the systemic causes of the 2008 crash (Knowles, Phillips, & 
Lidberg, 2015; Starkman, 2014; Stiglitz, 2011; Tambini, 2010). With some notable 
exceptions (M. Berry, 2012; M. Berry, 2016), far less attention has been devoted to how the 
interactions between media and policy actors have shaped the austerity that followed. 
Given the potential scale of this topic, we slice into the relationships between media 
and policy actors in a way that reflects an important part of how media systems now work. 
We focus on the public Twitter interactions between journalists, political elites, and the IFS 
during the 2015 UK general election campaign. Our goal is to explain how and why the 
authority of a think tank whose strategy was founded and perfected during the broadcast era 
is now being translated to the social media environment. We develop a new, social media 
theory of primary definers and show how the political authority on which primary definition 
rests is co-constructed and propagated by professional journalists and political elites. Central 
to this process is behaviour that we conceptualize and measure: authority signalling. We 
combine two methods: human-coded content analysis and network analysis. Our data 
comprise the network of Twitter discourse mentioning the IFS during the 38-day campaign 
period of the 2015 UK general election (16,619 tweets, including 4,754 tweets whose 
hyperlinked content we analysed). 
Despite Twitter’s reputation for being chaotic, we find that the IFS’s authority 
translates to this environment. We argue that this is because Twitter can function as a stage 
for an interpretive game in which political and journalistic elites seek to acquire authority and 
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status. We find remarkably little contestation of the IFS’s authority among partisans, 
journalists, or indeed any other group, including other think tanks. We reveal the 
conditions—in this case a particular incentive structure affecting the interactions between 
elite journalists and policy actors—under which an organization is able to extend its reach 
into this potentially unruly space and become a new-style primary definer. Achieving primary 
definer authority is not simply a result of the direct influence of the IFS’s own interventions 
on Twitter. Rather, authority emerges because professional media and partisan elites have 
their own motivations for wanting to mobilize a nonpartisan think tank’s framing of credible 
policy. In our conclusion, we reflect on how our analysis might open up new avenues for 
understanding how ideological consensus can become established in social media settings.  
 
The IFS and Austerity as Fiscal Politics in the UK 
The IFS specializes in the economics of taxation and public spending. Founded in 1969 by 
four City of London financiers, today it is an independent, non-partisan think tank of around 
40 full-time research economists and is relatively financially autonomous from both the 
private and public sectors. It has been funded by a blend of corporate donations and grants 
from charities and various public bodies, including a small number of government 
departments and the UK’s academic research councils (Institute for Fiscal Studies, 2014). It 
has a list of ‘corporate members’ and is managed by a director who is overseen by an 
advisory council of 30 individuals from business, finance, academia, politics, and the civil 
service. 
The IFS defines its field of expertise narrowly. It focuses on fiscal policy and the 
government ‘balance sheet.’ It has avoided interventions in the debate about whether 
spending cuts and austerity are desirable or effective policies in themselves (Akam, 2016). 
This position rests on the implicit acceptance that deficit reduction is an unavoidable policy 
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norm. Yet economists have long been divided on the wisdom of deficit reduction for its own 
sake (Blyth, 2013). And since the 2008 crash they have been joined in their scepticism by 
citizens’ movements and NGOs. A range of alternative, anti-austerity economic perspectives 
has emerged in the UK and elsewhere. In the UK, some of these grew from the protest and 
activism of the trade unions, Occupy, anti-tax avoidance movement UKUncut, and the 
disability rights and student movements. There is also a more staid network of organizations 
that question deficit reduction’s social costs, its basic effectiveness in maintaining living 
standards, and its ability to provide governments with the tax revenues they need to reduce 
government debt in the long run. These include the non-partisan Resolution Foundation, and 
the broadly leftist New Economics Foundation (slogan: ‘economics as if people and the 
planet mattered’), Compass, and the Tax Justice Network. There is also the fiscal stimulus 
approach favoured by a community of broadly Keynesian academic economists (see for 
example Stiglitz, 2015), and the ‘wealth tax’ approach led by Thomas Piketty (2014).  
In short, the IFS’s narrow, self-defined remit matters. If the organization has become 
the ‘word of God’ on tax and spending during an election campaign, this threatens the 
normative principle with which we began: a media system ought to promote a diversity of 
public information on the assumptions underlying policy. 
 
Think Tanks and Media 
Almost nothing is known about the online influence of policy think tanks, even though many 
of these elite organizations are highly prominent in everyday political communication. 
Previous research on think tanks has three characteristics relevant to our study. First, there is 
definitional uncertainty. The dilemmas are not central to our aims in this article but we build 
on the useful definitions of Schlesinger (2009: 4-5) and McNutt and Marchildon (2009: 221). 
Think tanks produce policy knowledge and move among policy and media elites, to whom 
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they gain access due to their expert capital. While many think tanks are aligned with parties 
and government, they are usually relatively autonomous of parties, NGOs, and the public and 
private sectors. Think tanks mostly strive to promote their own agendas rather than those of 
their funders. They emphasize analytical research and they orient their information toward 
those who implement and discuss policy. They mostly claim to contribute to, though not 
represent, the public interest. 
Second, research has considered whether think tanks influence parties and 
government policy-making (Cockett, 1995; Denham & Garnett, 1998; Pautz, 2010; Stone, 
1996). In his study of two liberal-left think tanks in the UK, Schlesinger (2009: 17) writes of 
a ‘double movement’: governments use think tanks to legitimize their decisions with expert 
evidence but also as distancing devices when airing new policy ideas. We integrate this 
understanding of think tanks’ boundary and brokerage roles but redirect it toward analysis of 
how a similar double movement might work in mediated interactions. 
Third, limited research exists on the intersection between think tanks and media, and 
what little there is pre-dates social media (McNutt and Marchildon, 2009; Rich & Weaver, 
2000). Research building on Bennett’s influential theory of indexing, which suggests the 
range of opinion in media coverage is shaped by the level of disagreement among 
government and legislative elites, hints at how the growth of think tanks might be changing 
news. However, this does not focus on think tanks in any detail because it assumes they are 
secondary in importance to official government sources (Bennett, 1990; Bennett, Lawrence, 
& Livingston, 2007: 134-135). 
 
The Theory of Primary Definers 
The theory of primary definers forms an important part of Stuart Hall et al.’s highly 
influential (1978) book on the social production of news. Using street crime as a case study, 
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Hall et al. argued that elite media reproduce consensus, not because of their inherent bias, but 
because they routinely work in relations of reciprocity and interdependence with policy elites. 
The approach was built on a mix of critical theories of ideology, the sociology of knowledge, 
and what was, at the time, an emerging body of empirical research on the social construction 
of news. Hall et al.’s work has influenced much research on framing, agenda-setting, 
audience behaviour, and the sociology of news, among many other subfields. Very little of 
this scholarship examines the role of independent expert sources.2 And, for obvious reasons, 
the original theory had nothing to say about the role of social media in potentially 
reconfiguring how primary defining works. We want to revisit, renew, and extend the theory. 
The central concern here is how routine structures of news production explain how 
media come to ‘reproduce the definitions of the powerful, without being, in a simple sense, in 
their pay’ (Hall et al., 1978: 57). This task becomes all the more important in the UK, where 
strong public service norms of ‘due impartiality’ govern television and radio news and 
prevent most broadcast journalists from editorializing. Due to the familiar pressures of news 
production—scarcity of time, money, and personnel—media organizations tend to become 
‘cued in’ to specific news topics by ‘regular and reliable institutional sources.’ Not only do 
such sources enhance the credibility of journalists’ work, they also legitimize journalists’ 
roles as masterly providers of ‘objective’ coverage of contentious issues. 
Primary definer status may emerge due to the formal position of an individual—a 
government spokesperson for example.3 Alternatively, it may emerge from an individual’s or 
a group’s claim to represent an organized interest. But just as significant in the process are 
expert sources like think tanks, whose status derives from specialist knowledge. Experts are 
particularly important for enabling professional media to maintain public service impartiality 
norms: they provide journalists with valuable opportunities to rise above sectional partisan 
conflicts by promoting ‘independent,’ ‘authoritative,’ and credible judgments on public 
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policy and the behaviour of public figures. Experts allow journalists to invoke information 
and opinion that is ‘external’ to partisan conflict and to mobilize these as resources that 
enable them to act in the political field while remaining insulated from accusations of 
partisan capture and bias. At the same time, experts are useful to political elites who also seek 
credible support for their policies from outside the partisan field. 
As impartiality norms converge with journalists’ and politicians’ incentives to rely on 
expert sources, media organizations tend to routinely reproduce a narrow spectrum of views. 
Primary definers become so deeply implicated in news production practices that their 
interpretations of social reality come to form the initial definitions of policy problems— 
reference points to which all further news coverage and political action must be seen to 
respond. While counter-definers may emerge over time, the possibility of competition pushes 
primary definers to maintain their status through close relationships with media 
organizations. And they are assisted in this task by politicians, whose own professional 
incentive structure encourages them to build long-term relations of interdependence with the 
experts that can enhance their own knowledge, status, and power. 
 
A Social Media Theory of Primary Definers 
A core insight of the original theory is just as relevant today: there are strong relations of 
interdependence among journalists, political actors, and expert sources. Building on this, in 
the field of UK economic news we suggest that a particular incentive structure binds together 
these actors on social media and that the outcome is the co-construction and propagation of 
primary definer authority. 
Today, in contrast with the era of untrammeled broadcast media dominance, social 
media function as an important public stage upon which this incentive structure plays out, 
often in real-time and under great competitive pressure (Chadwick, 2013). Social media serve 
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as platforms on which politicians and their staff, journalists, and engaged activists can 
publicize their activities and enhance their reputations and influence. Social media enable 
participation in an interpretive game in which competing but ultimately interdependent elites 
seek to acquire authority. These interactions are characterized by what we term authority 
signalling: a process whereby journalists, politicians, and activists define and share 
information from expert sources in ways that enhance theirs and the expert source’s status, 
legitimacy, and ultimately power. 
This leads us to the final part of our theory: how power works in social media 
environments. Self-promotion is built into the logic of social media, but this alone does not 
necessarily create the conditions for powerful action. In a media environment where exposure 
comes from the cascading circulation and recirculation of information by large numbers of 
ordinary users, real power derives just as much from what others say about an organization as 
it does from what an organization says about itself. On Twitter, the construction and 
propagation of authority does not so much derive from a user’s own tweets, or even simply 
from the number of followers a user has, as it does from others tweeting and retweeting about 
that user (Bakshy, Mason, Hofman, & Watts, 2011; Cha, Haddadi, Benevenuto, & Gummadi, 
2010; Freelon & Karpf, 2015). Thus, it is important to examine how the affordances of 
Twitter are used in various combinations by network actors to enhance or undermine the 
authority of others in the network. An expert think tank’s own interventions on Twitter 
undoubtedly matter but what matters more is that professional media and partisans mobilize a 
think tank’s policy discourse. While the rest of the actors in the network spread a think tank’s 
information and opinion, we can expect the think tank itself to rise above the fray. It does not 
need to be an active advocate of its own ideas, because others in the network (and, indeed, 
the broader media system) will perform that function for it, by signalling its authority to 
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others. We see this as the essence of how primary definers emerge in social media 
environments. 
 
Exploring a Primary Definer on Social Media: Research Design and Method 
For the entirety of the 2015 UK general election ‘short campaign’ (March 30, 2015 to May 6, 
2015) we used automated software, Tweepository, to mine Twitter’s search application 
programming interface (API) for tweets mentioning and posted by the IFS. This yielded a 
dataset of 16,619 tweets, including retweets. We undertook human-coded quantitative content 
analysis and network analysis of this dataset.4 
Our content analysis combined inductive and deductive practice. We wanted our 
conceptual constructs to translate to Twitter’s unique communication environment. We first 
reviewed the entire dataset and carried out exploratory qualitative analysis of approximately 
500 randomly selected tweets. We then examined retweets and identified recurring narrative 
themes that provided clues about how the IFS was portrayed within the Twitter network 
during the campaign. 
We then identified the total of 8,947 unique Twitter user accounts in our dataset. 
Next, using three Twitter metadata fields—name, username, and profile summary—we (the 
authors) categorized users according to whether they were a journalist or a supporter of a 
British political party. Our approach was strict: we categorized only those accounts where 
user role or partisanship was explicit from these metadata fields. To be coded as a partisan a 
user’s profile had to contain the name of a party. For a user to be coded as a journalist the 
profile had to contain reference to their job or the name of a media organization for whom 
they worked. Intercoder reliability (Krippendorff’s alpha) for this user partisanship/role 
variable, based on a random sample of 100 users, was .90. On the basis of our strict criteria 
we were able to positively identify 1,645 partisans or journalists: 18.4 percent of the 8,947 
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unique Twitter users in our dataset. These 1,645 partisans or journalists were the authors of 
3,627 tweets (21.8 percent of the 16,619 tweets in the dataset). In the analyses that follow, 
where we break down our content analysis to refer to partisans and journalists our findings 
are based on this 18.4 percent of users and 21.8 percent of tweets. However, our coding for 
authority signalling and our network analysis was based on a much larger subset of the data, 
as we shall explain shortly. 
Next, we developed a pilot coding frame to analyse our entire dataset of tweets. To 
operationalize our concept of authority signalling, we broke this behaviour down into three 
basic types. First, overt authority signalling. This refers to tweets that clearly and overtly 
gave the impression that the IFS was authoritative, for example when the organization was 
described as ‘independent’ or ‘respected.’ Second, and equally important for our theory, we 
coded for assumed authority signalling. This refers to tweets that presented the IFS’s 
information, opinion, or status as if they were simply ‘the facts’ or ‘common sense’ and 
beyond critique. The third category we developed was contested authority signalling: 
messages that conveyed disagreement with the IFS’s information, opinion, or status. We also 
coded the authorial intent of any hyperlinked material in a tweet, such as news stories, blog 
posts, websites, and reports. We were interested in whether externally-linked organizational 
sources were important for authority signalling and how this might vary according to the type 
of organization being invoked. 
Coding for authority signalling required a larger team. To pilot this, we assigned four 
independent coders the same 100 randomly-selected tweets. After reviewing the inter-coder 
reliability results we refined our coding frame. We removed measures with low reliability, 
rewrote some of the coding manual and conducted further coder training. We then ran a 
second pilot using a revised coding frame. Inter-coder reliability improved significantly 
during the second pilot and reached excellent levels for all variables used in this article.5 
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Network analysis, which augmented our content analysis, is based on the assumption 
that an actor’s location in a network reveals her relational power vis-a-vis other actors 
(Borgatti, Everett, & Johnson, 2013: 1). Twitter, with its follower, mention, and retweet 
networks lends itself to such analysis. Because we were interested in the propagation of 
authority signalling we reconstructed the entire retweet network among the 7,392 users in our 
dataset who were connected by a retweet relationship. In other words, this subset of 7,392 
users comprises those who either retweeted at least one other user or had at least one of their 
tweets retweeted by another user. Those users who did not retweet another user or who did 
not have any of their tweets retweeted were excluded. This retweet network contained a total 
of 11,819 retweets. Finally, we used the widely-used open source software Gephi 
(http://gephi.org) to compute the network centralities of all users.  
 
Analysis: The Construction of Authority 
We expected to find low levels of contested authority signalling and high levels of overt 
authority signalling, as Twitter users signalled their clear praise of the IFS. We also expected 
levels of assumed authority signalling to be higher still. This would be evidence that the 
IFS’s information and opinions had become so deeply embedded in the circulation of ideas 
that their interpretations had become taken-for-granted reference points, part of the common 
sense of an important network of economic policy discourse on Twitter during the campaign. 
 - Figure 1 - 
As Figure 1 shows, the results are remarkably clear. Fully 47.5 percent of the tweets 
mentioning the IFS during the 2015 UK general election campaign signalled the assumed 
authority of the think tank. They treated the IFS’s information or opinion in a matter of fact 
way. While 36 percent of tweets signalled the overt authority of the IFS, only 6.1 percent of 
tweets actually contested it. 
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We now break the authority signalling results down to see if these varied according to 
a user’s partisanship and whether a tweet came from a journalist. As Figure 2 reveals, 
journalists on Twitter were remarkably important for constructing the authority of the IFS 
during the 2015 general election campaign. Fully 68 percent of journalists’ tweets in our 
sample conveyed the assumption that the IFS was authoritative while 18.3 percent of their 
tweets contained overt descriptions of the IFS’s authority. In contrast, only 3.4 percent of 
journalists’ tweets contested the IFS’s authority. Partisans of the UK’s three major parties—
the right of centre Conservatives, left-of-centre Labour, and the centrist Liberal Democrats—
were also deferential. Conservative partisans were particularly willing to post tweets that 
overtly signalled the IFS’s authority: 59.1 percent of their tweets did so. Labour partisans 
were close behind, on 45 percent. Tweets from partisans of these two parties also scored 
highly on our assumed authority variable. The Liberal Democrats were slightly less keen to 
post tweets that overtly signalled authority but their role in the co-construction of the IFS’s 
primary definer status is beyond doubt: 70 percent of their tweets signalled assumed authority 
and only 0.2 percent contested it. 
- Figure 2 - 
Figure 2 also shows that supporters of the Scottish nationalist SNP, the anti-
immigration, anti-EU party UKIP, and, to a much lesser extent, the Greens were more likely 
to contest the IFS’s authority than supporters of the major parties and journalists. The SNP in 
particular stand out here: 40.1 percent of their tweets took issue with the IFS and levels of 
assumed authority signalling among SNP supporters dipped to 30.4 percent, the lowest figure 
in our dataset. A close examination of the tweets from SNP partisans revealed that some of 
their supporters were critical of the IFS’s forecast that the SNP were planning greater 
austerity measures in Scotland than the Labour Party. Still, overall, opinion among SNP 
partisans was evenly divided: 40.4 percent of their tweets were not critical of the IFS. With 
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UKIP the picture was similar. Of their supporters’ tweets, 32 percent contested the IFS’s 
authority and levels of overt authority signalling were low in comparison with tweets from 
the supporters of the main parties and from journalists. However, a solid 50.7 percent of 
UKIP tweets conveyed the IFS’s assumed authority. And, if we add UKIP supporters’ overt 
authority tweets (10.7 percent) it becomes clear that UKIP, like the Greens, were part of the 
consensus that the IFS was authoritative. 
The final stage of our content analysis examined the kinds of organizations that were 
invoked in tweets when users signalled the authority of the IFS. Hyperlinks are a crucial part 
of the Twitter platform and our network was no exception. In total, 28.6 percent of the tweets 
in our dataset contained hyperlinks that played a role in authority signalling. Strong evidence 
of overt and assumed authority signalling among these hyperlinked sources would be further 
evidence of the IFS’ primary definer status on Twitter. Not only would it reveal the extent to 
which users went beyond simple Twitter messages to provided external evidence for their 
authority signalling, it would also provide evidence of the broader network of content from 
media and political organizations that was important for augmenting the co-construction of 
the IFS’s status. 
- Table 1 - 
As Table 1 shows, hyperlinks to external sources were important for both overt and 
assumed authority signalling. The most common hyperlinked sources were the IFS’s own 
websites and documents. This might seem obvious. However, the IFS only tweeted 58 times 
during the campaign and only 32 of these tweets linked back to its own website. Thus, the 
IFS’s own website was in fact a resource that other actors in the network were willing to use 
to support their own positions. As we outlined in our theoretical discussion of power on 
Twitter, we should expect a primary definer to rise above the fray and let others do the work 
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of signalling its authority. The IFS did not need to be an active advocate of its own ideas, 
because others came to perform that function for it. 
But who performed this authority signalling work? Media organizations, particularly 
the BBC, newspapers, and online-only news organizations were particularly important linked 
sources. And a large proportion of the linked content was highly favourable toward the IFS. A 
total of 22.0 percent of the content linked from BBC websites overtly signalled the IFS’s 
authority while 78.0 percent signalled the IFS’s assumed authority. Among liberal/left 
newspapers the figure for overt authority signalling was 40.2 percent. Close examination of 
the tweets revealed that during the campaign the Guardian newspaper printed several ‘puff 
pieces’ about the IFS and its role in holding politicians to account. 
Content from the websites of the two of the major parties—the Conservatives and the 
Liberal Democrats—was also important. Conservative content was heavily skewed toward 
overt authority signalling by two tweets. Both contained an online political poster graphic 
stating that the IFS, ‘Britain’s most respected economic research institute,’ had ‘confirmed 
that debt would be ‘about £90bn more’’ under a future Labour government. The first of these 
tweets came from party leader David Cameron and was retweeted 450 times. The second was 
part of an orchestrated campaign by Conservative supporters who tweeted the poster 490 
times (probably by clicking a share button on the Conservative website) and those tweets 
were retweeted a further 59 times. 
The only results that contradicted this overall pattern of authority signalling, albeit in 
very minor ways given the tiny numbers involved, were tweets that linked to blogs and to the 
websites of other think tanks. These are worth discussing because they provide further 
evidence of just how deeply entrenched the IFS’s authoritative status became. As Table 1 
shows, 70.4 percent of the tweets that linked to blogs contested the IFS’s authority. However, 
this amounted to only 57 tweets overall (including retweets)—just 0.3 percent of all tweets 
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mentioning the IFS during the campaign—so it would be misleading to suggest that there was 
a critical blogosphere using Twitter to spread their criticisms of the IFS. And drilling down 
into the data reveals that only two blogs accounted for 48 of those 57 tweets. The first, with 
28 tweets (including retweets), was anti-tax avoidance Tax Justice Network blogger Richard 
Murphy’s blog, which contained a post critical of the IFS’s free market orthodoxies. The 
second was the Conservative grassroots website Conservative Home, with 20 tweets 
(including retweets), which contained a post by Conservative MP Robert Halfon questioning 
why the IFS received public funding when the Treasury could perform the think tank’s role. 
The authority of the IFS looks even stronger if we consider the tweets that linked to 
other think tanks. Only 18 tweets in total linked to think tanks other than the IFS. This 
amounts to just 0.1 percent of the tweets (including retweets) mentioning the IFS during the 
campaign. If the IFS’s authority was being genuinely contested, we would have seen much 
more juxtaposition of other think tanks’ information in this Twitter network. And, in any case, 
of those 18 tweets linking to other think tanks, only five actually contested the IFS’s 
authority. Thus, the number of 27.8 percent for contested authority signalling among other 
think tanks is accounted for by a blog post questioning the IFS’s narrow approach to 
economic policy. This appeared on the website of the trade union-funded organization the 
Centre for Labour and Social Studies. With only five tweets (a tweet and four retweets) out of 
a network of 16,619 tweets, there was little meaningful critical opposition to the IFS in this 
network. 
 
Analysis: The Propagation of Authority 
Consider a simple fact. By the end of the campaign the IFS had 14,130 followers on Twitter, 
yet it followed not a single user. Given the extent to which the IFS’s information circulates 
around Britain’s media and political elites, this is one basic metric revealing its desire to be 
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seen as authoritative. 
Network analysis offers widely accepted measures to assess the relational power of 
actors in a directed network like Twitter (Kumar, Mortstatter, & Liu, 2014), though none of 
these methods has been used to study primary definers. Since our theory is concerned with 
identifying those who propagate the opinions or information of the IFS, we computed two 
relevant rankings of power: in-degree centrality and eigenvector centrality. 
- Figure 3 - 
In the context of Twitter, in-degree centrality is a measure of how many times a user’s 
messages are circulated in the network. We operationalized this as the number of retweets 
each user received. Figure 3 is a network visualization we generated using the Fruchterman-
Reingold algorithm in Gephi. It provides an overview of the entire retweet network among 
those who were connected by a retweet relationship in our dataset. The fifteen most retweeted 
users in the network are labelled by username. The larger the label, the greater the number of 
retweets a user received. Nodes are coloured according to partisanship and user role—
attributes we identified in our content analysis. For legibility, ties are displayed in the colour 
of the user being retweeted. For example, a glance at the Labour partisan @LabourEoin 
reveals that he was highly retweeted and that he was mostly retweeted by identified Labour 
partisans and users whose partisanship or role we were unable to identify (note the mostly red 
and grey nodes clustered around him).6 
Table 2 shows key metrics in the network. Most striking is the importance of 
journalists in propagating the information of the IFS. Journalists’ tweets mentioning the think 
tank received more retweets than any other group of actors we identified (note the large 
number of dark grey clusters in Figure 3). The IFS’s own 58 campaign tweets were retweeted 
853 times, placing them third overall. However, only 7 of the retweets of the IFS’s tweets 
came from the other top ten most retweeted users. Clearly the IFS was powerful in this 
 18 
network, but the IFS’s own tweets and the retweets of its tweets actually account for only a 
small proportion of its power. Other actors did the work of propagation by posting tweets 
mentioning the IFS and these were retweeted by other users. The BBC’s Economics Editor at 
the time, Robert Peston, with more than half a million followers, received by far the most 
retweets (2,207). Our examination of the dataset revealed that Peston posted 22 tweets 
mentioning the IFS during the campaign. All of these conveyed the IFS’s overt or assumed 
authority and not one contested it. Peston was joined in the top ten ranking by four other 
journalists. Most prominent among these were the BBC’s Scotland Business Editor, Douglas 
Fraser (@BBCDouglasF), and BBC’s Scotland Correspondent, James Cook 
(BBCJamesCook). All but two of their combined 43 campaign tweets conveyed the IFS’s 
overt and assumed authority. 
- Table 2 - 
Also notable in the top ten for in-degree centrality are Conservative, Labour and 
Liberal Democrat accounts; further evidence of the bloc of senior journalists and the main 
parties united by their construction of the IFS as authoritative. Above, we showed how 
important Conservative Prime Minister David Cameron’s tweet linking to an online political 
poster was for invoking the IFS’s authority. As Table 2 shows, Cameron’s solitary tweet and 
its 450 retweets gained him a ranking of fourth on in-degree centrality.  
Overall, the users in our top ten for in-degree centrality posted 141 tweets mentioning 
the IFS during the campaign. Together, those 141 tweets were retweeted 6,410 times. Not a 
single tweet among those 141 contested the IFS’s authority. 
One user in this ranking, Dr Éoin Clarke (@LabourEoin), is unusual because he is a 
Labour blogger and activist and untypical of the media and political elites in whose company 
he found himself when discussing the IFS during the campaign. As the network visualization 
and Table 2 both show, Clarke’s tweets mentioning the IFS were heavily retweeted: he ranked 
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second only to Robert Peston in this regard. Clarke had 40,742 followers by his final tweet of 
the campaign—a large number, but far fewer than Peston’s half a million. So what explains 
Clarke’s importance in this network? A close examination of the 19 tweets Clarke posted 
reveals he used the same strategy as prime minister David Cameron. Clarke constantly 
invoked the overt and assumed authority of the IFS in his promotion of Labour’s economic 
policies and his criticisms of the Conservatives. Our content analysis found that all but two of 
Clarke’s tweets signalled the overt or assumed authority of the IFS and none signalled any 
contestation (two of his tweets did not signal any authority). See Table 3 for examples. 
We need to be clear about the process here. The authority of a primary definer 
emerges from the interdependent relations between political actors and journalists. Éoin 
Clarke posted 19 tweets mentioning the IFS during the campaign. None was a retweet of an 
IFS tweet. Instead, Clarke chose to package information from the IFS in a way that suited his 
partisan goals. He then targeted Labour’s political opponents with critical questions, 
stimulating retweets by other Labour supporters. In the process Clarke further reinforced the 
IFS’s authority, not only due to the language he used—’highly respected,’ ‘greatly 
respected’—but also through his simple, unadorned descriptions of IFS opinion. As Table 3 
shows, irrespective of the details of the partisan battle, the IFS’s status was enhanced. 
Indeed, journalist Robert Peston behaved in the same way. None of Peston’s 22 tweets 
mentioning the IFS during the campaign was a direct retweet of an IFS tweet, but he was 
particularly fond of using Twitter’s so-called dot insertion hack. In other words, by placing 
‘.@TheIFS’ at the beginning of his tweets he guaranteed that the tweet was not treated as a 
simple reply to the IFS but would be circulated to all of his followers. All but 7 of Peston’s 22 
tweets used this device. But unlike Clarke the political activist, Peston was invoking the 
authority of the IFS in his role as a journalist eager to hold all the major parties to account for 
their spending plans, as Table 3 shows. 
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Our second measure of network power is eigenvector centrality (see Table 2). Like in-
degree centrality, this is a formal measure that can be operationalized in different ways 
according to network context. Its advantage over simpler measures like in-degree is that it 
assumes an actor’s centrality is based on the centrality values of those to whom an actor is 
connected. The eigenvector centrality of an actor increases if she has ties to other actors with 
high centrality. This measure provides a useful snapshot of the structure of a whole network 
because it assumes that an individual is more likely to have greater power if s/he is connected 
to powerful others (Bonacich, 1972). Translated into the context of the retweeting patterns in 
our Twitter IFS network, a user was relatively powerful if that user’s tweets were retweeted 
by other users whose own tweets were highly retweeted, and so on. 
The right side section of Table 2 shows the top ten users by eigenvector centrality. 
The results are revealing. Apart from two exceptions there is remarkable overlap with the 
rankings for in-degree centrality. Once again, journalists did much powerful work in creating 
information about the IFS that spread across this network. Five of the top ten are individual 
journalists and a sixth user—BBC Radio 4’s World at One is a radio news show account. As 
with the in-degree rankings, the three major parties are also represented, with @LabourEoin 
again featuring alongside the political and media elite actors. In essence, this is the core 
group of powerful—and powerfully-connected—tweeters in the network.  
 
Conclusion 
An enduring theme in the research on digital media and politics is the extent to which older 
forms of political organization are adapting to digital media and shaping the transition to a 
new settlement in their own image. We contribute to this debate by explaining the 
mechanisms through which Britain’s most important think tank is extending its authority into 
the social media domain. We have developed and extended the original theory of primary 
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definers by revealing the incentive structure of interdependence among political elites and 
journalists that embeds the information and opinions of this expert source on social media. 
We have shown how the IFS’s opinion and information were invoked and mobilized on 
Twitter by a wide range of partisans and media professionals. The IFS is a primary definer on 
Twitter because its authority is co-constructed and propagated by journalistic and political 
elites and, in one case, a highly connected and energetic political activist. We found some 
modest evidence that SNP partisans were willing to contest the IFS’s authority. This perhaps 
speaks to an important seam of nationalist scepticism of the Westminster establishment. 
Some of the SNP partisans’ tweets referred to the IFS’s public funding, for example. But only 
a minority of the SNP’s supporters were willing to signal their contestation, and, despite their 
criticism, it is difficult to see how they might have juxtaposed alternative perspectives in this 
space. The information and opinions of other think tanks were barely visible. We were 
surprised to find such little contestation of the IFS and virtually no juxtaposition of other 
think tanks’ information and opinions in this network.  
Why do these findings matter? To answer this question requires revisiting the two 
contexts with which we began: first, the discourse of ‘deficit reduction’ so dominant in UK 
politics during the post-crash general elections of 2010 and 2015 (C. Berry, 2016) and 
second, the normative principle that a media system ought to promote a diversity of public 
information about the assumptions underlying policy. We might expect this sort of outcome 
in an elite-dominated media system with comparatively high barriers to entry like broadcast-
era, 1970s Britain, when Hall et al.’s theory of primary definers was first established. But we 
should be surprised and concerned to find these sorts of outcomes in today’s media system. 
The systemic nature of these interactions throws into jeopardy some accepted wisdom, both 
about the ‘uncontrollable’ nature of social media but also about social media’s contribution to 
information and opinion pluralism. These findings are all the more surprising given that 
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critiques of the theory of primary definers have suggested that the process is more contingent 
and contested than Hall et al. suggested (Schlesinger, 1990). 
Diversity of information about the assumptions underlying economic policy is 
essential to informed citizenship. In a basic sense this requires public contestation of a 
leading organization’s opinion or the juxtaposition of that organization’s opinion and 
information with another’s, even if that organization is nonpartisan. But in Britain during the 
2015 general election there was very little pluralism of this kind in the Twitter network of 
people discussing the IFS. This is not the doing of any single individual or group. It is the 
logic of an incentive structure of interdependence where expertise can lead to authority which 
in turn can lead to power. However, that authority still needs to be actively constructed. We 
have shown that this logic translates to Twitter. The social media environment can be 
surprisingly fertile for maintaining the power of a primary definer. And, as we outlined in our 
opening section, this particular primary definer has been a central actor in the politics of 
deficit reduction, spending cuts, and austerity in Britain. 
Our findings also have broader implications for understanding how ideological 
consensus develops in environments that, at first glance, do not seem well-suited to such 
levels of agreement. In this case, the key force was a group of high-profile, public service 
television and radio journalists who were active on Twitter during the election and keen to 
spread the IFS’s information and opinions to enhance their own authority to issue judgements 
on the partisan struggle. They were joined by Twitter users representing Britain’s three major 
parties, who also sought to mobilize the IFS for their own purposes. But the overwhelming 
dominance of public service broadcasters in both constructing the IFS as authoritative and 
propagating that authority online suggests that, despite the growth of social media, there can 
be surprising limits on the extent to which our media systems help citizens learn about the 
assumptions underlying policy. 
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Notes 
1 Jamie Angus, Editor of BBC Radio 4’s Today Programme, interviewed by Andrew 
Chadwick, November 11, 2016. 
2 See: 
https://scholar.google.co.uk/scholar?cites=16134060271562009690&as_sdt=2005&sciodt=0,
5&hl=en  
3 For the rich seam of research examining the effects of media proximity to government 
officials see, for example, Bennett (1990), Bennett, Lawrence & Livingston (2007), Entman 
(2010), and Lawrence (2012). 
4 The search query was [‘Institute for Fiscal Studies’ OR @theIFS OR from:theIFS]. 
Tweepository allows for a search query to be automated to run every 20 minutes for an 
extended period, in this case from March 30, 2015 to May 6, 2015. The retrieved data—up to 
a maximum of 1,800 tweets every 20 minutes—are stored iteratively, without duplication, in 
a database that runs on the EPrints free and open source web repository platform 
(http://www.eprints.org). At the end of the period, data can be exported in a variety of file 
formats including CSV and JSON. For Tweepository’s source code see 
http://bazaar.eprints.org/431/. For previous uses of this tool see Murthy et al. (2016) and 
Tinati et al. (2012). The Twitter search API filters for spam, incomplete URLs, and some 
offensive content. However, so long as (a) the search terms used are not likely to return 
tweets that Twitter tries to filter and (b) API rate limits are not exceeded, the search API 
results have been demonstrated to be between 96 and 100 percent complete (Thelwall, 2015). 
Our data collection fulfilled both of these criteria. 
5 For our authority signaling Krippendorff’s alpha was .83. For the measure identifying 
whether there were externally-linked sources that conveyed or contested the authority of the 
IFS, Krippendorff’s alpha was .91. For the measure identifying the type of organization being 
hyperlinked Krippendorff’s alpha was .80. All of our content analysis categories were 
mutually exclusive. Content was coded for the most prevalent category. Where applicable, 
our measures had an option for coders to indicate that there was no evidence of any of the 
categories listed. Our pilot and final coding frames are available in our data and method file 
at http://files.andrewchadwick.com/mcs2017/data.zip. 
6 Recall that our content analysis identified 1,645 partisans or journalists. Because we wanted 
to reveal the structure of the entire retweet network, users who could not be identified as a 
partisan or a journalist are included in Figure 3 and coloured light gray. 
 
 Figure 1. Authority signaling in tweets mentioning the IFS during the 2015 UK general election campaign. 
N=16,619 tweets. Note: 10.5 percent of tweets contained no authority signaling and are excluded. 
 
 
Figure 2.  Authority signaling in tweets mentioning the IFS during the 2015 UK general election campaign, 
by partisanship and journalism role. N=1,645 users, 3,627 tweets. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1. Types of organizations users invoked via hyperlinks to signal the authority of the IFS, ordered by total number of hyperlinks to each 
organization type. 
Type of organization Number of 
hyperlinks to type 
of organization 
(N) 
Hyperlinked 
sources with overt 
authority 
signaling (%) 
Hyperlinked 
sources with 
assumed authority 
signaling (%) 
 
Hyperlinked 
sources with 
contested 
authority 
signaling (%) 
IFS 1,923 96.0 4.0 0.1 
Media organization – liberal/left newspaper 845 40.2 44.6 15.1 
Media organization – BBC 513 22.0 78.0 0 
Party – Conservatives 473 100 0 0 
Party – Liberal Democrats 149 38.3 61.7 0 
Media organization – right-wing newspaper 139 33.8 46.8 19.4 
Media organization – online-only news e.g. Buzzfeed, HuffPo 90 22.2 77.8 0 
Blog 81 23.5 6.2 70.4 
Education 70 30.0 64.3 5.7 
Pressure group/campaigning organization/charity 66 10.6 86.4 3.0 
Business/City/finance organization 54 42.6 57.4 0 
Media organization – ITV, Channel 4, or Channel 5 41 29.3 70.7 0 
Think tank (not IFS) 18 44.4 27.8 27.8 
Media organization - Business news broadcaster 16 56.3 43.8 0 
Media organization - Sky News 11 36.4 63.6 0 
Media organization – News agency e.g. PA, Reuters 4 25.0 75.0 0 
Opinion polling company 4 100 0 0 
Government/regulatory body 2 0 0 100 
Party – Labour 1 100 0 0 
Party – UKIP 0 0 0 0 
Party – SNP 0 0 0 0 
Party – Green 0 0 0 0 
Party – Plaid Cymru 0 0 0 0 
Trade union 0 0 0 0 
Other type of organization 264 16.7 51.5 31.8 
     
Totals 4764 64.0 29.5 6.5 
 
Notes: N = 4754 tweets with hyperlinks. Ten tweets linked to two separate organizations. It includes 37 tweets from the IFS’s own account that contained hyperlinks, 35 of which signaled the 
IFS’s overt authority. Images hosted on Twitter’s image servers were not treated as external hyperlinks. Totals may not equal 100% due to rounding. 
IFS: Institute for Fiscal Studies; UKIP: United Kingdom Independence Party; SNP: Scottish National Party.
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Figure 3. Visualization of the retweet network of users mentioning the IFS during the 2015 UK general 
election campaign. N=7,392 users; 11,819 retweets. High resolution version here: 
http://files.andrewchadwick.com/mcs2017/Anstead_Chadwick_MCS2017_IFS_retweet_network  
 
 
 
 
Table 2. Top 10 Twitter users mentioning the IFS during the 2015 general election campaign, ranked by two measures of power in the network 
In-degree centrality Eigenvector centrality 
Rank Value Username Description Followers Rank Value Username Description Followers 
1 2207 @Peston Robert Peston, BBC 
Economics Editor 
510,898 1 1 @Peston Robert Peston, BBC 
Economics Editor 
510,898 
2 1542 @LabourEoin Eoin Clarke, Labour 
activist 
40,742 2 0.6628 @LabourEoin Eoin Clarke, Labour 
activist 
40742 
3 853 @TheIFS The IFS 14,572 3 0.4304 @TheIFS The IFS 14572 
4 450 @David_Cameron Prime minister, Leader 
of the Conservative 
Party 
996,965 4 0.1882 @BBCDouglasF Douglas Fraser, BBC 
Scotland Business and 
Economy Editor 
14,801 
5 414 @BBCDouglasF Douglas Fraser, BBC 
Scotland Business and 
Economy Editor 
14,801 5 0.1880 @David_Cameron Prime Minister, Leader of 
the Conservative Party 
996,965 
6 217 @LibDems Liberal Democrat 
Party 
91,902 6 0.0945 @LibDems Liberal Democrat Party 91,902 
7 203 @BBCJamesCook James Cook, BBC 
Scotland 
Correspondent 
28,144 7 0.0918 @BBCWorldatOne BBC Radio 4’s World at 
One show 
3,724 
8 192 @faisalislam Faisal Islam, Political 
Editor, Sky News 
92,706 8 0.0907 @BBCNormanS Norman Smith, BBC 
News Assistant Political 
Editor 
55,578 
9 183 @EvidenceUK Account run by Eoin 
Clarke, Labour activist 
10,383 9 0.0872 @BBCJamesCook James Cook, BBC 
Scotland Correspondent 
28,144 
10 149 @patrickjbutler Society, health and 
education editor, the 
Guardian 
21,128 10 0.0831 @faisalislam Faisal Islam, Political 
Editor, Sky News 
92,706 
 
IFS: Institute for Fiscal Studies.
Table 3. Top 15 most retweeted tweets mentioning the IFS during the 2015 UK general election campaign 
 
Rank User Followers Tweet Retweets Authority 
signaling 
1 @David_Cameron 996,965 A damning verdict on Labour's borrowing plans from the independent Institute for Fiscal Studies. 
http://t.co/mfHCeo7Lzd 
450 Overt 
2 @LabourEoin 40,742 The much respected Institute for Fiscal Studies is very clear, NHS Spending, 2011-18, is falling 
9.1% per patient http://t.co/RYim1JyRX6 
293 Overt 
3 @Peston 510,898 .@TheIFS say Tory right-to-buy for housing assocs could deplete social housing and worse UK 
public finances http://t.co/vwXjjzAfmh  
261 Overt (in 
link) 
4 @Peston “ .@TheIFS says fiscal gap between Lab and Tories biggest since at least 1992. This election matters 246 Assumed 
5 @Peston “ Debt would be £90bn lower under Tories than Lab says @TheIFS, if they meet their tax and 
spending plans 
246 Assumed 
6 @Peston “ .@TheIFS amazingly says SNP would actually shrink public spending as share of GDP more than 
Labour over course of parliament 
238 Overt 
7 @Peston “ .@TheIFS says Lab probably right that Tories' planned cuts bigger than in other big rich countries 229 Assumed 
8 @Peston “ Tories to cut £30bn from unprotected depts, LibDems £12bn, Lab £1bn say @TheIFS 188 Assumed 
9 @LabourEoin 40,742 Institute for Fiscal Studies could not be clearer. David Cameron delivered largest cuts to Education 
since the 1950s http://t.co/gE559SgfEm  
179 Overt 
10 @LabourEoin “ The Institute for Fiscal Studies have examined some of the £12bn Welfare Cuts the Tories are 
planning next election http://t.co/pIGjspZXfW  
176 Assumed 
11 @BBCJamesCook 28,144 Golden election rule. @TheIFS are ALWAYS RIGHT when talking about your opponents and 
ALWAYS WRONG when talking about you. #ge2015 
171 Overt 
12 @Peston 510,898 .@TheIFS by 2018/19 Tories to cut unprotected depts by 17.9% compared with 1.8% cut for Lab 
(& 9% for LibDems by 2017/18) 
165 Assumed 
13 @LabourEoin 40,742 The Institute for Fiscal Studies say only the wealthier will benefit from the Tories £1.3bn 
Inheritance Tax giveaway http://t.co/IYw9WO8kv4  
139 Assumed 
14 @LabourEoin “ The greatly respected Institute for Fiscal Studies issue 3 dire warnings about the Tory Right to Buy 
Policy (see pic) http://t.co/179nzQkpfm  
131 Overt 
15 @EvidenceUK 10,383 Today the respected Institute for Fiscal Studies rubbished Tory claim that Labour would raise taxes 
£3k per household http://t.co/sASWURndi7  
123 Overt 
 
NHS: National Health Service; SNP: Scottish National Party; GDP: gross domestic product. 
